Extract Layer 1 to cores/mizan-python (mizan-core)

Pull cache/keys.py (HMAC cache key derivation) and mwt.py (Mizan Web Token)
out of backends/mizan-django and into a new cores/mizan-python package.
mizan-django re-imports them via the new mizan_core module.

Naming: directory cores/mizan-python/, distribution mizan-core, importable
module mizan_core. mizan-django keeps its existing 'mizan' distribution slot
on PyPI; the two coexist as distinct packages.

Wiring:
- backends/mizan-django/pyproject.toml gains a 'mizan-core' dep with a
  [tool.uv.sources] path entry (editable install from ../../cores/mizan-python).
- Makefile install target prepends 'cd cores/mizan-python && uv pip install -e .'
- 3 import sites in mizan-django updated: cache/__init__.py, jwt/functions.py,
  client/executor.py — all now import from mizan_core.

Test split:
- 3 unit-test classes (CacheKeyDerivationTests, MWTCreationTests,
  PermissionKeyTests) move to cores/mizan-python/tests/, rewritten against
  unittest.TestCase (no Django dep). The cross-language pin test (pinned
  HMAC hex digests against mizan-ts) moves with CacheKeyDerivationTests.
- Integration tests stay in mizan-django (CacheBackendTests, CachePurgeTests,
  CacheIntegrationTests, RevParameterTests, MWTAuthIntegrationTests) — they
  need the Django request flow.

Verified:
- mizan-core: 15/15 pass (incl. cross-language pin)
- mizan-django: 348 pass, 21 skip, 0 fail
- mizan-ts: edge-compat 34/34 pass — protocol invariant holds, the moved
  Python derive_cache_key still produces the exact hex digests TS pins against.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-05-06 01:32:54 -04:00
parent 9d2781b52c
commit 37e61c646b
14 changed files with 202 additions and 192 deletions

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"""
Cache key derivation — HMAC-SHA256 over JSON-canonical form.
Protocol-critical: every Mizan adapter must produce identical output
for identical inputs. Cross-language conformance verified by pin tests.
Scoped purge recomputes the key directly — no reverse index needed.
Broad purge uses a context prefix scan.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import hmac
import json
from typing import Any
# Context prefix for broad purge (SCAN pattern)
CONTEXT_KEY_PREFIX = "ctx:"
def derive_cache_key(
secret: str,
context: str,
params: dict[str, Any],
user_id: str | None = None,
rev: int = 0,
) -> str:
"""
Derive a deterministic HMAC-SHA256 cache key.
Returns a prefixed key: "ctx:{context}:{hmac_hex}" so that
broad purge can SCAN by prefix "ctx:{context}:*".
"""
def _normalize(v: Any) -> str:
"""Normalize values for cross-language HMAC consistency.
Python str(True)="True" but JS String(true)="true". Use JSON-native forms."""
if v is True:
return "true"
if v is False:
return "false"
if v is None:
return "null"
return str(v)
sorted_params = {k: _normalize(v) for k, v in sorted(params.items())}
key_data: dict[str, Any] = {"c": context, "p": sorted_params, "r": rev}
if user_id is not None:
key_data["u"] = str(user_id)
message = json.dumps(key_data, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
hmac_hex = hmac.new(
secret.encode("utf-8"),
message.encode("utf-8"),
hashlib.sha256,
).hexdigest()
return f"{CONTEXT_KEY_PREFIX}{context}:{hmac_hex}"

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"""
MWT (Mizan Web Token) — Protocol-owned identity layer.
MWT is a standard JWT (RFC 7519, HMAC-SHA256) with Mizan-specific claims,
traveling on the `X-Mizan-Token` header. It provides:
- `sub`: user_id for HMAC cache key derivation
- `pkey`: permission state hash for staleness detection
- `kid`: key ID in the JOSE header (per RFC 7515) for secret rotation
- `aud`: audience binding to prevent cross-tenant replay
- `nbf`: not-before to handle clock skew
MWT is issued from an authenticated Django session. The app handles
authentication (session, social auth, etc.); Mizan issues MWT from
the authenticated identity. Edge Workers and the origin-side cache
validate MWT to extract user identity for cache operations.
Usage:
from mizan.mwt import create_mwt, decode_mwt, MWTUser
Configuration:
MIZAN_MWT_SECRET: MWT signing key (separate from MIZAN_CACHE_SECRET)
MIZAN_MWT_TTL: token lifetime in seconds (default: 300)
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import logging
import time
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Any
import jwt
logger = logging.getLogger("mizan.mwt")
@dataclass
class MWTPayload:
"""Decoded MWT claims."""
sub: str # user_id
staff: bool # is_staff
super: bool # is_superuser
pkey: str # permission state hash (full SHA-256 hex)
kid: str # key ID (from JOSE header)
aud: str # audience
iat: int # issued at
exp: int # expiration
class MWTUser:
"""
Minimal user object created from MWT claims.
Used as request.user for MWT-authenticated requests.
No database query required — all data comes from the token.
"""
def __init__(self, payload: MWTPayload):
self.id = int(payload.sub)
self.pk = self.id
self.is_staff = payload.staff
self.is_superuser = payload.super
self.is_authenticated = True
self.is_anonymous = False
self.is_active = True
self.pkey = payload.pkey
def __str__(self) -> str:
return f"MWTUser(id={self.id})"
def __repr__(self) -> str:
return f"MWTUser(id={self.id}, pkey={self.pkey[:8]}...)"
def compute_permission_key(user: Any) -> str:
"""
Compute a deterministic hash of the user's permission state.
Includes is_staff, is_superuser, and all Django permissions.
When the MWT expires and is refreshed, the new pkey reflects
any permission changes. The short TTL controls the staleness window.
Returns the full 64-character SHA-256 hex digest.
"""
perms = sorted(user.get_all_permissions()) if hasattr(user, "get_all_permissions") else []
staff = "1" if getattr(user, "is_staff", False) else "0"
superuser = "1" if getattr(user, "is_superuser", False) else "0"
blob = f"{staff}:{superuser}:{','.join(perms)}"
return hashlib.sha256(blob.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
def create_mwt(
user: Any,
secret: str,
ttl: int = 300,
audience: str = "mizan",
kid: str = "v1",
) -> str:
"""
Create an MWT from an authenticated Django user.
Args:
user: Django user object (must have pk, is_staff, is_superuser).
secret: MIZAN_MWT_SECRET signing key.
ttl: Token lifetime in seconds (default: 300 = 5 minutes).
audience: Audience claim for cross-tenant protection.
kid: Key ID placed in JOSE header (per RFC 7515) for rotation.
Returns:
Encoded JWT string.
"""
now = int(time.time())
payload = {
"sub": str(user.pk),
"staff": getattr(user, "is_staff", False),
"super": getattr(user, "is_superuser", False),
"pkey": compute_permission_key(user),
"aud": audience,
"iat": now,
"nbf": now,
"exp": now + ttl,
}
# kid goes in the JOSE header per RFC 7515, not the payload
headers = {"kid": kid}
return jwt.encode(payload, secret, algorithm="HS256", headers=headers)
def decode_mwt(
token: str,
secret: str,
audience: str = "mizan",
) -> MWTPayload | None:
"""
Decode and validate an MWT.
Returns MWTPayload on success, None on any failure (expired, invalid
signature, wrong audience, not-yet-valid, malformed).
"""
try:
# Decode header first to extract kid
unverified_header = jwt.get_unverified_header(token)
kid = unverified_header.get("kid", "v1")
data = jwt.decode(
token,
secret,
algorithms=["HS256"],
audience=audience,
)
except jwt.PyJWTError:
logger.debug("MWT decode failed", exc_info=True)
return None
try:
return MWTPayload(
sub=data["sub"],
staff=data.get("staff", False),
super=data.get("super", False),
pkey=data.get("pkey", ""),
kid=kid,
aud=audience,
iat=data["iat"],
exp=data["exp"],
)
except (KeyError, TypeError):
logger.debug("MWT payload missing required claims", exc_info=True)
return None